1460773177-ca8ddb92-9723-4d48-8bd5-96e174994ccb

1. A method for providing a mobile digital wallet identification (ID) system for use with a mobile electronic device having a processor, memory, code in the memory for implementing in the processor a mobile digital wallet, and an NFC transceiver, the mobile electronic device being operatively coupled to a secure element and being in wireless communication with a secure wallet server over at least one wireless network, the method comprising:
receiving at the mobile digital wallet a service provider request which requests access to a subset of a set of personal ID information to enable the service provider to provide a service, the set of personal ID information being stored both in the secure element and at the secure wallet server;
determining by the mobile digital wallet, using code executing in the processor, a minimum-required-subset of the set of personal ID information necessary to satisfy the access request to the requested subset of the set of personal ID information;
analyzing, by the mobile digital wallet, using code executing in the processor, whether to provide the minimum-required-subset of the personal ID information from the secure element via the NFC transceiver or from the secure wallet server via the wireless network; and
causing the minimum-required-subset of the set of personal ID information to be provided to the service provider in response to the analyzing step having concluded to provide the minimum-required-subset of the set of personal ID information.
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising, initializing a wireless download of at least one of a widget and a secure application over the wireless network from a server of the service provider subsequent to the service provider receiving the minimum-required-subset of the set of personal ID information as a result of the causing step.
3. The method of claim 1, further comprising, prior to the causing step, acquiring by the mobile digital wallet an account identifier and an access identifier from the user, the account identifier being associated with an account comprising the set of personal ID information and the access identifier indicating a right of the user to access the account.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the access identifier is at least one of a numeric code, an alphabetical code, an alphanumeric code, and a gesture, and wherein the access identifier is acquired via a User Interface (UI) of the mobile electronic device and detected by the mobile digital wallet.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the service provider request is an initiator request generated by a service provider-NFC transceiver, and wherein the mobile electronic device is a target of the initiator request.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the service provider request is a response generated by a target service provider-NFC transceiver in response to an initiator request sent from the NFC transceiver of the mobile electronic device.
7. The method of claim 1, further comprising activating the NFC transceiver for radio frequency (RF) communication prior to the receiving step, enabling the receiving of the service provider request.
8. The method of claim 1, the receiving step further comprising receiving at the mobile digital wallet an electronic notification comprising the service provider request.
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the electronic notification is one of a text message, multimedia message, instant message, and e-mail, notifying the user of a desire of the service provider to access the subset of the set of personal ID information.
10. The method of claim 1, wherein the set of personal ID information includes at least one of the user’s government-issued ID information, identifying image, biometric data, secure login credentials, membership information, address, and contact information.
11. A mobile digital wallet identification (ID) system comprising:
a mobile electronic device having a processor, memory, code in the memory for implementing in the processor a mobile digital wallet, and an NFC transceiver;
a secure element, the mobile electronic device being operatively coupled to the secure element; and
a secure wallet server, the mobile electronic device being in wireless communication with the secure wallet server over at least one wireless network;
wherein the code in the memory for implementing in the processor the mobile digital wallet is executable in the processor of the mobile electronic device which, when executed, configures the processor to:
receive at the mobile digital wallet a service provider request which requests access to a subset of a set of personal ID information to enable the service provider to provide a service, the set of personal ID information being stored both in the secure element and at the secure wallet server;
determine by the mobile digital wallet, using code executing in the processor, a minimum-required-subset of the set of personal ID information necessary to satisfy the access request to the requested subset of the set of personal ID information;
analyze, by the mobile digital wallet, using code executing in the processor, whether to provide the minimum-required-subset of the personal ID information from the secure element via the NFC transceiver or from the secure wallet server via the wireless network; and
cause the minimum-required-subset of the set of personal ID information to be provided to the service provider in response to the analyzing step having concluded to provide the minimum-required-subset of the set of personal ID.
12. The system of claim 11, further configured to initialize a wireless download of at least one of a widget and a secure application over the wireless network from a server of the service provider subsequent to the service provider receiving the minimum-required-subset of the set of personal ID information as a result of the causing operation.
13. The system of claim 11, the processor further configured to acquire by the mobile digital wallet, prior to the causing operation, an account identifier and an access identifier from the user, the account identifier being associated with an account comprising the set of personal ID information and the access identifier indicating a right of the user to access the account.
14. The system of claim 13, wherein the access identifier is at least one of a numeric code, an alphabetical code, an alphanumeric code, and a gesture, and wherein the access identifier is acquired via a User Interface (UI) of the mobile electronic device and detected by the mobile digital wallet.
15. The system of claim 11, wherein the service provider request is an initiator request generated by a service provider-NFC transceiver, and wherein the mobile electronic device is a target of the initiator request.
16. The system of claim 11, wherein the service provider request is a response generated by a target service provider-NFC transceiver in response to an initiator request sent from the NFC transceiver of the mobile electronic device.
17. The system of claim 11, further configured to activate the NFC transceiver for radio frequency (RF) communication prior to the receiving step, enabling the receiving of the service provider request.
18. The system of claim 11, the processor further configured to receive at the mobile digital wallet an electronic notification comprising the service provider request.
19. The system of claim 18, wherein the electronic notification is one of a text message, multimedia message, instant message, and e-mail, notifying the user of a desire of the service provider to access the subset of the set of personal ID information.
20. The system of claim 1, wherein the set of personal ID information includes at least one of the user’s government-issued ID information, identifying image, biometric data, secure login credentials, membership information, address, and contact information.

The claims below are in addition to those above.
All refrences to claim(s) which appear below refer to the numbering after this setence.

1. A method of masking a cryptographic operation using a generator G, said method comprising the steps of:
a) generating a secret value;
b) generating a masking value for association with said secret value;
c) applying said masking value to said secret value and said generator to obtain a new value corresponding to the combination of said secret value, said generator and said masking value for use as a session public key;
d) using said new value in said cryptographic operation, thereby using a secret generating point corresponding to a combination of said masking value and said generator G in place of said generator G in said cryptographic operation.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein said further values are updated by said random value each time a digital signature is generated.
3. The method of claim 1, said masking value, when divided into first and second parts, has said random value added said first part and subtracted from said second part such that the sum of said first and second parts and said associated random value is equivalent to said original secret value.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein said cryptographic system is an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm.
5. The method claim 1, wherein said masking value is divided into a plurality of parts and each of said parts is combined with a random value to provide a plurality of further values such that when said further values are combined a value equivalent to a session private key corresponding to said session public is obtained.
6. A method of computing a digital signature on a message m, said signature being computed by a signer having a private key d and a public key dG, where G is a generator of a cryptographic group, said method comprising:
a) dividing said private key d into a plurality of private key parts;
b) presenting a masking value \u03b2;
c) generating an ephemeral private key k;
d) obtaining a first signature component from an ephemeral public key kG\u2032 where G\u2032 corresponds to a product of said masking value \u03b2 and said generator G;
e) computing a value e derived from said message m by application of cryptographic function;
f) computing a second signature component utilizing said masking value \u03b2, said plurality of private key parts, said ephemeral private key k, said first signature component, and said value e.
7. A method according to claim 6, wherein said masking value is presented as a plurality of masking value parts, and at least one of the computation of said ephemeral public key kG\u2032 and the computation of said signature component uses said plurality of masking value parts.
8. A method according to claim 7, wherein said plurality of private parts comprises a pair of values d1,d2 with d=d1+d2.
9. A method according to claim 8, wherein said plurality of masking value parts comprises a pair of values \u03b21,\u03b22 with \u03b2=\u03b21+\u03b22.
10. A method according to claim 9, wherein said second signature component is computed as s=(k\u03b21+k\u03b22)\u22121(e+d1r+d2r) mod n, where n is an order of said cryptographic group.
11. A method according to claim 9, further comprising the step of generating a random value w, and wherein the step of computing said signature component utilizes said random value w.
12. A method according to claim 10, wherein said signature component is computed as s=w(kw\u03b21+kw\u03b22)\u22121(e+d1r+d2r) mod n, where n is an order of said cryptographic group.
13. A method of computing a public key corresponding to a private key d in a cryptosystem, wherein the cryptosystem uses a generator G, said method comprising the steps of:
a) representing a masking value \u03b2 as a plurality of values which may be combined to obtain said masking value;
b) combining each of said plurality of values with said private key to obtain a plurality of private key components;
c) combining each of said plurality of private key components with said generator to obtain a plurality of public key components;
d) combining said public key components to obtain said public key.
14. A method according to claim 12, wherein said plurality of public key components are combined by addition.
15. A method according to claim 12, wherein said plurality of values are combined with said private key by multiplication.
16. A method according to claim 12, wherein said plurality of private key components are combined with said generator by exponentiation.
17. A method according to claim 12, wherein said public key is computed as (d\u03b21)G+(d\u03b22)G.
18. A method of computing an ECDSA signature on a message m, said method being performed by a signer having a private key d and a public key dG, where G is a generator, said signature comprising an ephemeral public key r obtained from an ephemeral masked public key k and a signature component s derived from said message, m, said ephemeral private key k, and said private key d, said method characterised in that the computation of said signature comprises the steps of:
a) dividing said private key d into a plurality of private key parts;
b) presenting a masking \u03b2;
c) generating an ephemeral private key k;
d) obtaining a first signature component r from an ephemeral public key kG\u2032 where G\u2032 corresponds to a product of said masking \u03b2 and said generator G;
e) computing a value e derived from said message m by application of cryptographic function;
f) computing a second signature component utilizing said masking value, said plurality of private key parts, said ephemeral private key k, said first signature component r and said value e.
19. A method according to claim 17, wherein said masking value is presented as a plurality of masking value parts, and at least one of the computation of said ephemeral public key kG\u2032 and the computation of said signature component uses said plurality of masking value parts.
20. A method according to claim 18, wherein said plurality of private parts comprises a pair of values d1,d2 with d=d1+d2.
21. A method according to claim 20, wherein said signature component is computed as s=(k\u03b21+k\u03b22)\u22121(e+d1r+d2r) mod n, where n is an order of said cryptographic group.
22. A method according to claim 19, wherein said plurality of masking value parts comprises a pair of values \u03b21,\u03b22 with \u03b2=\u03b21+\u03b22.
23. A method according to claim 20, further comprising the step of generating a random value w, and wherein the step of computing said signature component utilizes said random value w.
24. A method according to claim 21, wherein said signature component is computed as s=w(kw\u03b21+kw\u03b22)\u22121(e+d1r+d2r) mod n, where n is an order of said cryptographic group.
25. A method of inverting an element k of a finite field, comprising the steps of:
a) generating a random value w;
b) computing wk and the inverse (wk)\u22121 thereof;
c) computing k\u22121 as w(wk)\u22121.
26. A method for masking a secret value k used in an elliptic curve cryptographic operation requiring use of a generator G comprising:
generating a masking value \u03b2 for association with said generator G;
associating said masking value \u03b2 with said generator G to obtain a secret generating point G\u2032; and
utilizing said secret generating point G\u2032 in performing a cryptographic operation using said secret value k.
27. The method according to claim 26 wherein said cryptographic operation is performed mod n, where n is the order of the secret generating point G\u2032.
28. The method according to claim 26 wherein said cryptographic operation comprises generation of a first signature component.
29. The method according to claim 28 comprising generating a second signature component using said first signature component and said secret value k and applying said masking value \u03b2 to said secret value k.
30. The method according to claim 29 wherein said masking value \u03b2 is divided into a plurality of parts each being applied to said secret value k.
31. The method according to claim 28 wherein said first signature component is an ECDSA signature component r.
32. A method for masking a secret value k used in a cryptographic operation comprising:
generating a masking value \u03b2;
dividing said masking value \u03b2 into a plurality of components;
applying each of said plurality of components to said secret value k in performing said cryptographic operation; and
updating said plurality of components by applying a random value to each said plurality of parts such that said plurality of parts, when combined, equal said masking value \u03b2.
33. The method according to claim 32 wherein said cryptographic operation comprises generation of a signature component.
34. The method according to claim 33 wherein said signature component is for an ECDSA signature.