1. An epoxy resin composition, comprising:
(A) an epoxy resin having at least two epoxy groups in one molecule;
(B) a curing agent; and
(C) 1 to 14 parts by weight of polystyrene, based on 100 parts by weight of the epoxy resin.
2. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 1, wherein the epoxy resin is selected from the group consisting of bisphenol A epoxy resin, bisphenol F epoxy resin, bisphenol S epoxy resin, phenol novolak epoxy resin, and cresol novolak epoxy resin.
3. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 2, the bisphenol A epoxy resin includes a brominated bisphenol A epoxy resin.
4. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 2, the phenol novolac epoxy resin includes DOPO-CNE which is obtained by reacting 10-dihydro-9-oxa-10-phosphahenanthrene-10-oxide (DOPO) with cresol novolac epoxy resin (CNE).
5. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 1, wherein polystyrene has a molecular weight of from 100,000 to 200,000
6. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 1, wherein the curing agent is selected from the group consisting of dicyandiamide, and styrene maleic anhydride copolymer.
7. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 1, wherein a ratio of an active group equivalent of the curing agent relative to an epoxy equivalent of the epoxy resin is 0.8 to 1.2.
8. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 1, further comprising a curing accelerator.
9. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 8, wherein the curing accelerator is present in an amount of from 0.05 to 0.15 parts by weight, based on 100 parts by weight of the epoxy resin.
10. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 8, wherein the curing accelerator includes imidazole.
11. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 1, further comprising an inorganic filler.
12. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 11, wherein the inorganic filler is present in an amount of from 60 to 120 parts by weight, based on 100 parts by weight of the epoxy resin.
13. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 11, wherein the inorganic filler is selected from the group consisting of talc, and aluminium hydroxide.
14. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 1, further comprising a cyanate ester resin.
15. The epoxy resin composition as claimed in claim 14, wherein the cyanate ester resin is present in an amount of from 10 to 30 parts by weight, based on 100 parts by weight of the epoxy resin.
16. A prepreg obtained by impregnating a reinforcing material with the epoxy resin composition according to claim 1 to form an impregnated substrate, and drying the impregnated substrate to a semi-cured state.
17. A metal-clad laminate obtained by placing two or more prepregs according to claim 16 one over another to prepare a stack of prepregs, placing a metal foil on at least one of top and bottom surfaces of the stack of prepregs, and hot-pressing the stack of prepregs and the metal foil.
The claims below are in addition to those above.
All refrences to claim(s) which appear below refer to the numbering after this setence.
1. A portable secure network device (PSND) for conducting secure transactions between a local computer and a remote server computer connected over a network, comprising:
a microprocessor;
an output device connected to the microprocessor;
a memory connected to the microprocessor wherein the memory comprises computer program instructions to cause the microprocessor:
to produce a shared association secret;
to display the shared association secret on the output device; and
to transmit the shared association secret to the remote server;
thereby ensuring that a user observing the output device and the remote server computer both possess the shared association secret.
2. The portable secure network device of claim 1, further comprising:
an input device connected to the microprocessor;
wherein the memory further comprises instructions to cause the microprocessor to receive a card holder verification (CHV) phrase entered by a user on the input device, and instructions to deny the user access services requiring authentication by the PSND unless the user enters a correct CHV.
3. The portable secure network device of claim 2, wherein the CHV is selected from the set including personal identification number (PIN), password, and biometric input.
4. The portable secure network device of claim 1, wherein the memory further comprises computer program instructions:
to cause the microprocessor to display a card-holder-verification shared secret on the output device;
to receive a user attempt of entering the card-holder-verification shared secret on the local computer;
whereby the microprocessor can thereby verify that the user operating the PSND and the user operating the local computer are the same person.
5. The portable secure network device of claim 1, wherein the memory further comprises computer program instructions:
to cause the microprocessor to transmit a match value (H) to the local computer and to a remote server whereby the remote server, upon receipt of the match value from both the microprocessor and the local computer, can match up transactions commenced on the local computer with transactions to be authenticated using the portable secure network device.
6. The portable secure network device of claim 1 wherein the memory further comprises computer program instructions:
to cause the microprocessor to establish a secure communications channel between the portable secure network device and the remote server and wherein the instructions to transmit the shared association secret utilize the secure communications channel to transmit the shared association secret.
7. The portable secure network device of claim 6 wherein the memory further comprises computer program instructions:
to cause the PSND to securely transmit sensitive information stored on the PSND to the remote server over the secure communication channel from the PSND to the remote server when needed and authorized by the user.
8. A method of operating a local computer, a remote server, and a portable secure network device to establish secure transactions between a user and a service executing on the remote server, comprising:
authenticating the user to the portable secure network device via card holder verification (CHV);
operating a first browser on the local computer to establish a connection between the user and the portable secure network device;
operating the portable secure network device to compute a card-holder-verification shared secret, a shared association secret, and a match value;
displaying the card-holder-verification shared secret on an output device of the portable secure network device and prompting the user to enter the card-holder-verification shared secret in the first browser of the local computer, thereby verifying that the user operating the local computer is the same person as the user operating the portable secure network device;
operating the portable secure network device to establish a secure connection to the remote server and to transmit on the secure connection a match value and the shared association secret to the remote server;
operating a second browser on the local computer to establish a connection between the user and the remote server;
operating the portable secure network device to transmit the match value to the second browser and operating the second browser to transmit the match value (H) to the remote server;
operating the remote server to associate the communications session from the PSND and the communications session from the second browser based on the identical mach value received from both the second browser and the PSND;
operating the portable secure network device to display the shared association secret on the output device;
operating the second browser to receive an input of the shared association secret from the user and to transmit the shared association secret to the remote server;
operating the remote server to authorize a transaction when remote server has received the correct shared association secret from the second browser.
9. The method of claim 8 wherein the card-holder-verification shared secret and the shared association secret are random numbers valid for only one session.
10. The method of claim 8 wherein the connection from the PSND to the remote server is a secure communications channel.
11. The method of claim 8 wherein the connection from the second browser to the remote server is a secure communications channel.
12. The method of claim 8 wherein the connection from the first browser to the PSND is a secure communication channel.
13. The method of claim 12, further comprising:
operating the PSND to securely transmit sensitive information stored on the PSND to the remote server over the secure communication channel from the PSND to the remote server when needed and authorized by the user.
14. A method of operating a local computer, a remote server, and a portable secure network device (PSND) to establish a secure transaction between a user and a service executing on the remote server, comprising:
generating an authorization one-time password on the portable secure network device;
displaying the authorization one-time password on an output device on the portable secure network device;
transmitting the authorization one-time password from the portable secure network device to the remote server using a secure communications link;
operating the local computer to receive an input of the authorization one-time password from the user and transmitting the user entry of the authorization one-time password to the remote server;
operating the remote server to authorize a transaction if the user entry matches the authorization one-time password received from the portable secure network device.
15. The method of claim 14 further comprising:
operating the PSND to require user authentication using an input device on the PSND.
16. The method of claim 14 further comprising:
operating the PSND to generate a card-holder-verification one-time password for authenticating a user of a local computer to commence secure transactions protected via the PSND;
operating the PSND to display the card-holder-verification one-time password on an output device of the PSND;
operating a browser on the local computer to require the user to enter the card-holder-verification one-time password and to receive an attempted card-holder-verification one-time password from the browser; and
operating the PSND to accept the user of the browser as an authorized user of the PSND if the attempted card-holder-verification one-time password matches the generated card-holder-verification one-time password.
17. The method of claim 14 further comprising the step of establishing secure communication channels from the PSND to the remote server and from the local computer to the remote server.
18. The method of claim 17, further comprising:
operating the PSND to securely transmit sensitive information stored on the PSND to the remote server over the secure communication channel from the PSND to the remote server when needed and authorized by the user.
19. A network smart card for insertion into a secure token having a display and an input device, the network smart card programmed with logic operable:
to cause an authorization random number to be displayed on the display; and
to transmit the authorization random number to a remote server over a secure communications channel;
whereby the remote server can authenticate a user of the network connected computer by comparing an entry of the authorization random number on a web browser instance on a network connected computer and the authorization random number as received from the network smart card.